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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Brandon D. G.

Farris appeals

from

his

judgment of conviction

methamphetamine, challenging the order denying his motion

Statement

Of The

Facts

at the

Idaho Falls Zoo. In a brazen move, the perpetrator—later

dubbed the “Zoo Burglar”—made
1,

p.1.)

to suppress.

And Course Of The Proceedings

There was a heist

(Aug. EX.

for possession of

way

his

in

by

cutting the fence surrounding the zoo.

Zoo Burglar made

After breaching the perimeter fence the

“the coins from the ‘Coins for Conservation’ vortex collection bucket.”

off With

(Aug. EX.

1,

p.1.)

There was no Video 0f the

In the aftermath of the heist an investigation ensued.

heist itself, but

some

Twin

Falls police

prior “incident” in August.

had surveillance photosl of a suspect 0n a bike from
(Aug. EX.

1,

p.1)

Someone “matching

the description”

of the August incident was also “recorded riding a similar bike through the zoo parking
lot” at

around 2:00 am. on the night 0f the

incidents” showing the suspected

description,

who

were distributed

heist.

(Aug. EX.

Zoo Burglar and

t0 the entire police

1, p. 1

p.1.)

his bike,

Photos “from both

along With a written

department—because, as the detective

wrote the email concluded, anyone “who would

needs t0 be stopped.” (Aug. EX.

1,

steal

from monkeys

is

a guy that

.)

1

It is unclear from the face of the exhibit which photos were from the night 0f the
Aug EX. 1,
and which photos were from the “last incident” in August of 2017.

(E

However,

it is

clear that the photos are

from two

different incidents:

suspect in a hoodie and Without a backpack; the other two

and baseball

hat,

with a backpack. (Compare Aug. EX.
1

1.,

show

pp.2-3

heist
p.1.)

two photos show the

m

the suspect in a t-shirt
pp.4-5.)

The district court made the additional factual findings that are relevant to this
appeal:
On February 14, 2017, [Parris pleaded] guilty to one count of
driving without privileges. Parris was then placed on probation for one
year. Judge Walker orally advised Parris that he “must follow other
normal terms of probation….” The judgment and order of conviction
indicates that Parris is required to “Refuse no alcohol or drug test or
search of person, property & vehicle.”
On September 17, 2017, near 11:30 PM, Officer Brian Smith
(“Smith”) was on patrol when he noticed a man riding a BMX style
bicycle, wearing a backpack, and carrying items in his hands. The bicycle
did not have safety lights on it. The man, along with the bicycle he was
riding, matched the description of an individual who had previously
burglarized the Idaho Falls Zoo. Smith initiated a stop to investigate
further. Smith identified the unknown man as Parris and discovered that
Parris was currently on probation.
When Smith stopped Parris, Parris was wearing a backpack. Smith
was suspicious that some of the stolen items from the zoo might be in the
backpack. Smith requested to search Parris’s person and backpack. Parris
refused consent. Smith then attempted to contact Smith’s [sic] probation
officer.
Smith was unable to reach Parris’s probation officer directly but
did speak with another supervising probation officer, Carol Martin
(“Martin”). Martin gave Smith permission to search Parris and indicated
that if Parris refused, she would meet him at the jail with an agent’s
warrant. Smith communicated this to Parris and Parris consented to a
search of his person and backpack. After officers discovered what
appeared to be a knife in Parris’s pocket, Parris was placed in handcuffs
for officer safety. During the search Smith also found a small baggy that
contained a white crystalline substance in one of Parris’s pockets. This
substance tested presumptive positive for methamphetamine.
(R., pp.104-05 (footnotes omitted, emphasis in original).)
The state charged Parris with possession of methamphetamine and possession of
paraphernalia. (R., pp.40-43.) Parris filed a motion to suppress evidence, in which he
conceded that the initial stop was lawful. (R., pp.78-85; Tr., p.34, Ls.18-21.) However,

2

Farris

moved

t0 suppress the

drug evidence “based upon two grounds”: his seizure “was

unreasonably extended” and his “consent t0 the search 0f his property and person was
coerced.” (R., p.78.)

The

district court disagreed.

“that Parris resembled the suspected

p.35, L.23

—

p.36, L.12.)

The

It

made

a factual ﬁnding on the record at the hearing

[Zoo Burglar] shown in the photos.”

district court

among

concluded,

“zoo burglary was one of the reasons for the

initial

extended due to the zoo burglary investigation”;
requirement by consenting t0 warrantless searches as

(R., p.1

[a]

Tr.,

other things, that 1) the

stop” and thus “the stop

2)

1 1;

Parris

was not

waived “the warrant

condition of probation, and [his]

consent was not coerced”; and 3) “discovery 0f the methamphetamine was inevitable.”
(R., pp.1 12,

114 (emphases

a1tered).)

The

district court

accordingly denied the motion.

(E R., pp.1 10-15.)
Farris pleaded guilty to possession of

methamphetamine, reserving the

right to

appeal from the district court’s order denying suppression. (R., p. 121.) The district court

sentenced Farris t0 four years imprisonment, ﬁxing one-and-a—half years, and placed
Farris

on probation.

(R., p.144.) Farris timely appealed.

(R., pp. 128-31, 149-53.)

ISSUES
Parris states the issue

Did the

on appeal

district court err in

as:

denying Mr. Parris’ motion t0 suppress?

(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)

I.

The

state rephrases the issues as:

Has

Farris failed to

show

the evidence should be suppressed because he has failed

to address the district court’s holding that Farris

waived

his right t0 warrantless

searches and seizures as a term of probation?

II.

Has

Parris failed to

show

the evidence should be suppressed because he has failed

t0 address the district court’s holding that the

methamphetamine would have been

inevitably discovered?

III.

Has

Farris failed to

show

clear error, insofar as his

argument depends 0n a

demonstrably incorrect presumption that the blurry photocopy 0f the exhibit was
the

same

quality as the photos the district court relied on?

ARGUMENT
I.

To Show The Evidence Should Have Been Suppressed Because He Has
To Challenge The District Court’s Conclusion That Farris Waived His Right T0
Warrantless Searches And Seizures As A Term Of Probation

Farris Fails

Failed

“Where

a lower court

one 0f those grounds

is

uncontested basis.” Rich

makes a

ruling based

0n two

alternative grounds

challenged on appeal, the appellate court must afﬁrm on the

V. State,

159 Idaho 553, 555, 364 P.3d 254, 256 (2015) (quoting

State V. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510, 517-18, 164 P.3d 790, 797-98 (2007)).

arguments 0n appeal parties must raise issues in their opening
Dep’t of Health

& Welfare,

be considered by

The

district court

One of those

briefs.

preserve

151 Idaho 310, 321, 256 P.3d 718, 729 (2011) (“In order to

arguments in the opening

and provide

brief.”).

denied suppression for several reasons.

(E R.,

reasons was that Parris waived the warrant requirement

t0 warrantless searches as a

To

Patterson V. State

this Court, the appellant is required t0 identify legal issues

authorities supporting the

and only

pp.110-17.)

when he consented

term of probation:

Based upon the judgment and order 0f conviction [in the prior case where
Farris was placed on probation], the Court concludes that Farris was aware
that he was waiving his right t0 warrantless searches and seizures as a
condition of probation. The Court also concludes that he did waive this
right. He had legal counsel at the hearing and could have consulted his
counsel. Mr. Farris signed the document but
he did not have t0 do so;
Parris also could have
he could have served the jail term instead.
withdrawn his consent prior t0 the search. However, When presented With
the legal options and implications of Withdrawing his consent (i.e., being
taken into custody and serving the jail time originally imposed), Farris
chose not t0 Withdraw consent and subj ected himself t0 the search.
(R., p.114.)

Farris concedes the initial stop

raised one issue

search

much

and he has only

(Appellant’s brief, p.6 (emphasis altered».

He

less challenge, the district court’s conclusion that the

was proper because

(E Appellant’s brief.)
this

brief, p.5)

0n appeal: he claims the stop was extended “without reasonable

suspicion of criminal activity”

bother t0 mention,

was proper (Appellant’s

Parris voluntarily

Accordingly, the

waived

does not
ensuing

his right t0 warrantless searches.

district court’s

decision must be afﬁrmed on

uncontested basis.

II.

T0 Show The Evidence Should Have Been Suppressed Because He Has
T0 Challenge The District Court’s Conclusion That The Methamphetamine Would
Have Been Inevitablv Discovered

Farris Fails

Failed

There

is

another uncontested basis for afﬁrming the district court’s order.

district court additionally

it

would have been

concluded

it

would not suppress

the

The

methamphetamine because

inevitably discovered:

was on probation when he was stopped by Ofﬁcer
Smith. Testimony was proffered at the Motion t0 Suppress hearing that if
Farris had persisted in Withdrawing consent t0 search,
Farris would
have been arrested on an agent’s warrant for Violating the terms of his
probation and been taken t0 jail. The Court heard testimony that Farris
would have been searched subsequent t0 arrest, placed in Smith’s patrol
The Court also heard testimony that Farris
car, and transported to jail.
would have been searched When he was booked into the jail. A search at
either of these junctures would have been lawﬁll; therefore, the Court
concludes that the discovery 0f the methamphetamine was inevitable and
Parris’s Motion to Suppress should be denied.

As

stated above, Parris

(R., p.1 15.)

This

contest.

is

another conclusion that Farris has not bothered t0 mention,

(E Appellant’s

brief.)

Farris concedes the initial stop

argued that the detention was unreasonably extended.

much

less

was proper and has only

(Appellant’s brief, pp.4-6.)

Because Farris does not challenge the court’s conclusion

would have been
his

Reply

methamphetamine

inevitably discovered (and because he cannot do so for the ﬁrst time in

brief), the district court’s decision

m, 159 Idaho

that the

at

must be afﬁrmed 0n

this

uncontested basis.

555, 364 P.3d at 256; Patterson, 151 Idaho at 321, 256 P.3d at 729.

III.

Farris Fails

To Show Clear Error Because His Argument Depends On A Demonstrablv
The Blurry Photocopy Of The Exhibit Is Representative Of
The Actual Exhibit The District Court Relied On

Incorrect Presumption That

A.

Introduction

Farris begins with a sensible concession:

(Appellant’s brief, p.5.) But Farris goes 0n

reasonable suspicion to initially detain him.

to argue that the district court clearly erred

Zoo

Burglar.

when

(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-10.)

because “[t]here

is

he admits that Ofﬁcer Smith had

it

concluded that Farris resembled the

Farris claims this

clearly erroneous

simply not enough detail in the photographs for a

determine Mr. Parris resembles the person photographed.”

(footnote omitted).)

was

Based on

this

trier

of fact to

(Appellant’s brief, p.8

purported error, and purported lack 0f “sufﬁcient

connection between Mr. Farris and the zoo burglar,” Farris concludes that “Ofﬁcer Smith
did not have reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. Parris

was unlawfully extended. (Appellant’s
This

argument

fails

because

brief,

it

was

the zoo burglar,” and the stop

pp.7-8 (emphasis altered).)

is

premised

0n a demonstrably incorrect

presumption. Farris thinks the exhibit currently “contained in the appellate record” “is

presumably the same as the quality of the image considered by the
(Appellant’s brief, p.8, n.3,) This

is

incorrect.

The

district court

district court.”

did not 100k at a blurry

photocopy; rather,

it

examined the photos

that can

be seen in the augmented record?

Mot. to Augment, pp.1-2; Solis Aff. pp.1-2; Aug. EX.

(State’s

show

copies of the actual photos

comes nowhere near showing
Moreover,

Parris’s

connection” similarly

that Farris truly does

resemble the Zoo Burglar, Farris

clear error.

additional

arguments

(ﬂ Appellant’s

fail.

Because high-quality

1.)

regarding

brief, pp.8—10.)

lack

the

Both

of “sufﬁcient

Farris

and his bike

tended to resemble the person and bike shown in the photos and described in the email.

Based 0n

this, the district

t0 justify

an investigation 0f the zoo burglary.

court correctly concluded there

Finally, regardless

was ample reasonable suspicion

0f the court’s decision 0n reasonable suspicion, Farris has

failed to challenge the district court’s conclusions regarding the probation

inevitable discovery.

even attempted

Because those conclusions were

to contest

them on the

correct,

waiver and

and because Farris has not

merits, the order denying the suppression

motion

should invariably be upheld.

B.

Standard

On
trial

Of Review

review 0f a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers t0 the

court’s ﬁndings of fact unless clearly erroneous, but exercises free review of the trial

court’s determination as to whether constitutional standards

the facts.

V. Fees,

2

have been satisﬁed in

light

of

State V. Willoughbv, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State

140 Idaho 81, 84, 9O P.3d 306, 309 (2004).

Contemporaneous With the ﬁling 0f this

brief, the state is

If

ﬁndings are supported by

moving

With the ﬁlll-color, high-quality scanned copy 0f the pictures the
at the hearing.

(E State’s Mot. to Augment; Solis Afﬁ; Aug. EX.
8

t0

augment the record
examined

district court
1.)

evidence in the record,

substantial

erroneous.”

those

“[f]indings

Will

not be

State V. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 648, 181 P.3d 1249,

1256

deemed
(Ct.

clearly

App. 2008)

(quoting State V. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 98, 137 P.3d 481, 485 (Ct. App. 2006)).

A Review Of A Full-Color, High-Quality Scanned Copy Of Exhibit

C.

Photocopy) Shows
Resembles The Zoo Burglar

The

Blurry

Pursuant t0 the Fourth

District

Court

Amendment of the United

0f the people t0 be secure in

their

Correctly

1

(And Not

Concluded

A

Farris

States Constitution “[t]he right

persons, houses, papers,

and

effects,

against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Such
a detention “is permissible if

it

is

suspicion that the detained person

Tem V.

(1981)).

is

has been, 0r

is,

is

facts

which

Ohio, 392 U.S.

1,

21 (1968); United States

Whether an ofﬁcer had reasonable suspicion

determined by the

totality

t0

of the circumstances. State

justify

about t0 be engaged in criminal

State V. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct.

activity.”

(citing

based upon speciﬁc articulable

V. Cortez,

App. 2003)

449 U.S. 41

1,

417

conduct an investigatory seizure

V.

Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932,

829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992).

The

district

court

correctly

determined that Ofﬁcer Smith had reasonable

suspicion t0 stop Farris to investigate the zoo burglary.

suspicious factor

description

The
burglar

I

was

(R., pp.111-12.)

The most

simple: the ofﬁcer concluded that Parris “matched the general

remembered from the zoo

burglar.” (Tr., p. 12, Ls.6-9.)

district court agreed.

concluded that “Farris resembled the suspected

shown

in the photos.”

It

(R., p.1

1 1.)

The

district court

made

this factual

ﬁnding

after looking at Farris in the suppression hearing, looking at the photos,

and comparing

the two:

And

[Defense Counsel]:
100k into

is

whether

law enforcement

is

Mr.

when

THE COURT:

horse situation, Where

trying t0 circumvent the Idaho constitution, the United

States constitution,
into probation,

so one of the issues that the Court Will need t0

this is just basically a stalking

[Parris’s] right, in the guise

0f an investigation

they’re really investigating the [zoo] burglary.

Mr. Crane,

me

let

ask:

Tell

me why

they can’t just

legitimately be investigating the burglary.

MR. CRANE:

Because, Your Honor, there’s not enough 0f a connection

between Mr. Farris and the burglary.

THE COURT:
argument.

know—as

I
I

Well,

mean,

was

let

I

me just

looked

indicate for your purposes 0f your

own

photographs and prepared

you

at the

looking, because the Court has t0

make

to,

the ﬁndings of

facts.

I

looked

at the

photographs and looked

And

they appear t0 be pretty similar.
that’s
that.

going to be

my ﬁnding

at

so

your client, and for the record,
guess my question is—I mean,

of fact, so you are going t0 have to deal with

And I’m kind of giving you a heads

MR. CRANE:

I

up.

Okay.

THE COURT: They

by the photograph, and looking at them
here in court, speciﬁcally it’s up to the Court t0 make that ﬁnding.
They’re pretty similar. So with that in mind, tell me Where you go.
(TL, p.35, L.9

A

— p.36,

appear, just

L.12.)

review 0f the high-quality copies of the photos the

unmistakably supports

this conclusion.

Farris,

Who

district court

examined

can be seen in the ofﬁcer’s on—body

Video that was admitted into evidence, clearly resembles the suspected Zoo Burglar in the
photos. (Compare, for example, Aug. EX.

On

appeal

Farris

(Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8.)

claims

He

that

1,

p.3 With Defense EX. 3, 00:25-00:30.)

this

argues that “[t]here

10

ﬁnding was

factual

is

clearly

erroneous.

simply not enough detail in the

photographs

for

photographed.”

a

trier

of fact

to

determine
This

(Appellant’s brief, p.8.)

Mr.
is

Farris

resembles

the

person

driving reason for Parris’s

the

conclusion that “Ofﬁcer Smith did not have reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. Farris

was

the zoo burglar.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-10.)

But Parris has
entire

failed to

argument depends 0n a

meet

fatally

his high

burden to show clear

ﬂawed presumption about

error.

In fact, his

the exhibits in the record.

Farris states that:

Appellate counsel cut and pasted the image [set forth in Parris’s brieﬁng]

from the exhibit contained in the appellate record, located at
Exhibit Volume 1, p.3. The quality 0f the image in this brief is the same
as the quality 0f the image located in the record, which is presumably the
directly

same as

the quality offhe

image considered by the

district court.

(Appellant’s brief, p.8, n.3 (emphasis added).)

The

latter

in the record is

presumption

1.)

simply incorrect.3 The blurry exhibit currently residing

an obvious photocopy 0f the actual exhibit, and

the district court laid eyes

Aug. EX.

is

The

0n When

it

made

district court clerk’s

its

show

that the

afﬁdavit afﬁrms

this:

1

ﬂ

the photocopy does not

(Solis Aff., pp.1-2.)

Because Farris

photocopied photos are “the same as the quality of the image

considered by the district court,” he

3

does not reﬂect What

comparison. (Compare Defense EX.

accurately reﬂect What the district court examined.

fails t0

it

fails to

prove his central

thesis: that “[t]here is

simply

presume that a “cut
and pasted image” Will be 0f the same quality When it is transferred from a full-size image
ﬁle into a Word-document brief. Digital images degrade When they are compressed and
resized. In any event, whether the “quality 0f the image in the brief is the same as the
quality of the image located in the record” is beside the point, insofar as the image

The former presumption

is

equally dubious.

currently “located in the record”

considered.

is

There

is

n0 reason

to

nothing close to the photos the

(E Solis Aff., pp.1-2.)
11

district court actually

not enough detail in the photographs for a

trier

of fact t0 determine Mr. Farris resembles

the person photographed.” (Appellant’s brief, p.8 (footnote omitted).)

T0

more than enough

the contrary, the actual photos contain

in-court identiﬁcation,

(m

augmented exhibit shows.

as the

detail t0 support

Aug. EX.

1.)

an

And

comparing high-ﬁdelity scanned copies 0f the actual photos with the on-body Video

shows the

district court

for example,

Aug. EX.

1,

Parris’s tertiary

example, Parris argues

got

it

right: Parris clearly

resembles the Zoo Burglar. (Compare,

p.3 With Defense EX. 3, 00:25-00:30.)

arguments fare no better in

light

of the augmented exhibit.

For

that,

[e]ven if Mr. Farris resembled the person photographed, there

was not a

sufﬁcient connection between Mr. Parris and the zoo burglar t0 create

reasonable suspicion that Mr. Farris was the zoo burglar.

Ofﬁcer Smith
testiﬁed he suspected Mr. Farris 0f being the zoo burglar because he was
0n a bike, carrying a backpack, wearing a hoodie and a baseball hat.
Signiﬁcantly, the email from the detective did not refer to a backpack, a

hoodie, 0r a baseball hat,

and

not clearfrom the photographs that the

it is

suspect was wearing a backpack, a hoodie, 0r a baseball hat.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 8 (internal citations omitted, emphasis added).)

This

is

sporting a backpack (Aug. EX.

(Aug. EX.

1,

The

likewise incorrect.

pp.4-5).

1,

pp.4-5), a hoodie

They show

Parris ﬁt this description to a tee

the

show

actual photos plainly

(Aug EX.

Zoo Burglar had

1,

pp.2-3),

facial hair.

on the night he was stopped:

hoodie, a hat, and “similar” facial hair.

(Tr., p.22, Ls.7-23.)

It

the

Zoo Burglar

and a baseball hat

(Aug. EX.

1,

pp.4-5.)

he had a backpack, a

was

therefore entirely

reasonable for the ofﬁcer to conclude that Farris “matched the general description of the
individual referenced in [the] e-mail

(T12, p.22,

and

Ls.1-23 (emphasis added).)

in the

It

was

12

photos,” and to stop him and investigate.

just as reasonable for the district court t0

determine, as a ﬁnding 0f

fact, that Farris

had previously burglarized the Idaho
Farris

makes a

Burglar’s bike.

“matched the description of an individual Who

Falls Zoo.” (R., p.105.)

similarly futile attempt t0 distinguish Parris’s bike

He

(Appellant’s brief, pp.8-9.)

Ofﬁcer Smith did not

testify that

and the Zoo

claims that “[W]ith respect to the bike,

Mr. Parris’s bike matched the description 0f the zoo

burglar’s bike, and the district court did not

make any ﬁndings

regarding the bike.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.9.) This twice-mistaken couplet ignores both the ofﬁcer’s testimony

and the

district court’s

explicit factual

ﬁnding

that Parris

was

riding “a

bicycle”—precisely the style of bike identiﬁed in the email. (R., p.105;
22; Aug. EX.

1,

BMX

Tr., p.12,

style

Ls.20-

p.1.)

Moreover, the photos plainly afﬁrm that the two bikes resembled one another.

They show

that the

Zoo Burglar was

light colored (possibly silver or

EX.

1.,

pp.1-5.) Parris’s bike

riding a

“BMX

style [bike]

chrome) front fork,” just as the email described

was a near—exact match—the on-body Video

BMX-style bike with a dark frame (ﬂ, gg, Defense EX.
silver 0r

chrome

Parris

front fork

with a dark frame and

(ﬂ, gg,

Defense EX.

3,

3,

reveals

was a

21 :01, 21 :57).

concludes by dismissing the zoo burglary investigation as a pretext.

had methamphetamine based 0n a “trade

knew

Farris

secret,” Farris surmises that the only thing

underpinning the extended detention was a hunch that Farris had drugs.

(Appellant’s

10 (citing Defense EX. 3 at 24:45-50).)

Incorrect.

Hunch,

it

(Aug.

16:54) and a light colored,

(Appellant’s brief, p.10.) Seizing 0n Ofﬁcer Smith’s ofﬂland remark that he

brief, p.

it.

A hunch is a “feeling or guess based on intuition rather than fact.”

m

Oxford Living Dictionary, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/deﬁnition/hunch

13

(last Visited

April

And

2019).

9,

Ofﬁcer Smith had ample fact—based suspicion

here,

The

detain Parris, as explained above.

Ofﬁcer Smith had reasonable suspicion
and

that

district court therefore correctly

was a

the detention

fails t0

show

D.

Irrespective

concluded that

zoo burglary

t0 detain Parris t0 investigate the

Smith “did not deviate from 0r abandon

that purpose.” (R., p.1

legitimate investigation supported

by reasonable

1

t0

And because

1.)

suspicion, Farris

the district court erred.

Of The

Of The

Duration

The

Stop,

District

Court Correctly

Concluded That The Evidence Should Not Be Suppressed Because Farris Waived
And Because The Evidence Would Have
Been Inevitably Discovered, Neither Of Which Have Been Challenged On The
Merits On Appeal
His Right To Warrantless Searches,

As noted

in Sections

I

and

II

above, the district court denied Parris’s suppression

motion for two additional reasons: because Farris waived his

be free from

right t0

warrantless searches as a condition of probation, and because the evidence

been inevitably discovered.
mention,

much

less challenge, either holding

time in his Reply), the
matter of course.

holdings.

as

it

explained

even

district court

A

why

Because Farris has not bothered

(and because he cannot do so for the ﬁrst

364 P.3d

at

256

Court concludes that the stop was unreasonably

district court

on

either (0r both)

of these alternative

wrote a well-reasoned and thoughtﬁll opinion that

to this brieﬁng.

In

Parris consented t0

t0

should be afﬁrmed 0n these uncontested bases as a

at 555,

if this

should afﬁrm the

The

Appendix

district court

m, 159 Idaho

Alternatively,

extended,

pp.112-115.)

(R.,

would have

it,

the court relied

waive his

attached

on Idaho authority and correctly

right t0 a warrantless search,

evidence would have been inevitably discovered. (App. A; R., pp.104-18.)

14

is

and

why

the

And based on

those correct, uncontested conclusions the evidence should not have been suppressed—

regardless of whether the stop

The

state

are uncontested

was unreasonably extended.

accordingly incorporates the district court’s alternate holdings, which

on appeal, and asks

this

Court to afﬁrm 0n those merits should

it

reach

them.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court afﬁrm the order denying Parris’s motion

to suppress evidence.

DATED this 23rd day of April, 2019.

/s/

Kale D. Gans

KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Case No. CR-2017-9957

Plaintiff,
v.

OPINION

BRANDON D G PARRIS,

AND ORDER ON

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

Defendant.

This Opinion and Order

is

in response to Defendant’s

Motion

t0 Suppress.

I.

FINDINGS OF FACT
For purposes of this Opinion and Order, the Court ﬁnds the following

On February

14,

2017, Brandon

facts:

D G Parris (“Farris”) plead guilty to one count of driving

without privileges. Parris was then placed on probation for one year. Judge Walker orally
advised Farris that he “must follow other normal terms of probation

'

Exhibit 2, State

“Exhibit 2”),

OPINION

at

v.

Farris, Bonneville

.”'
.

.

.

The judgment and

County case no. CR-2017-9957 (admitted February

5,

201 8) (hereinafter

09:23.

AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Page
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v

‘

V

order of conviction indicates that Farris

ofperson, property

On
when he

his hands.

riding,

required to “Refuse no alcohol or drug test or search

& vehicle.”2

September

noticed a

is

17, 2017, near 11:30

man riding a BMX

The bicycle did not have

PM, Ofﬁcer Brian Smith

style bicycle,

safety lights

on

(“Smith”) was on patrol

wearing a backpack, and carrying items in

it.

The man, along with the

bicycle he

was

matched the description 0f an individual who had previously burglarized the Idaho

Zoo. Smith initiated a stop to investigate

further.

Smith identiﬁed the unknown

man as

Falls

Parris

and

discovered that Parris was currently on probation.

When
some of the

Smith stopped

stolen items

Parris’s person

Parris, Parris

was wearing a backpack. Smith was suspicious

from the zoo might be

in the backpack.

Smith requested

and backpack. Parris refused consent. Smith then attempted

that

t0 search

to contact Smith’s

probation ofﬁcer.

Smith was unable

to reach Parris’s probation ofﬁcer directly but did speak with another

supervising probation ofﬁcer, Carol Martin (“Martin”). Martin gave Smith permission to search

Farris

and indicated

that if Parris refused, she

Smith communicated

this to Farris

would meet him

at the jail

with an agent’s warrant.

and Parris consented to a'search of his person and backpack.

After ofﬁcers discovered what appeared to be a knife in Parris’s pocket, Parris was placed in

handcuffs for ofﬁcer safety. During the search Smith also found a small baggy that contained a

white crystalline substance in one of Parris’s pockets. This substance tested presumptive positive
for

2

methamphetamine.

Exhibit 4, State

v.

Farris, Bonneville

County case no. CR-2017-9957 (admitted February

5,

201 8) (hereinaﬁer

“Exhibit 4”).
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II.

APPLICABLE LAW
United States Constitution,

l.

“The Fourth Amendment

to the

unreasonable searches and seizures.
the exercise of discretion

Amendment IV; Idaho

Its

United States Constitution guarantees freedom from

purpose

is

by governmental agents

security against arbitrary invasions.”3

Constitution, Art. I,§ 17

The Idaho

to

impose a standard of reasonableness upon

t0 safeguard

an individual's privacy and

State Constitution offers the

same

protection,

with language similar to the Federal Constitution: “The right 0f the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be

violated;

and n0 warrant

shall issue

without probable cause shown by afﬁdavit, particularly

describing the place to be searched and the person 0r thing t0 be seized.”4 In order t0 ensure
these rights and protect against erosion the courts have declared, “[S]earches conducted outside

the judicial process, without prior approval

the Fourth

by judge 0r

magistrate, are per se unreasonable under

only to a few speciﬁcally established and well-delineated

Amendment ——subject

exceptions.”5

Reasonable Suspicion

2.

Generally, a seizure of a person must be based on probable cause to be

reasonable.6

However, the United

States

deemed

and Idaho Supreme Courts have delineated

this

narrow

exception:

[L]imited

investigatory

detentions,

based 0n

less

than probable cause,

are

justiﬁed by an ofﬁcer’s reasonable articulable suspicion that a
person has committed, 0r is about to commit, a crime. Reasonable suspicion must
be based on speciﬁc, articulable facts and the rational inferences that can be

permissible

when

drawn from those

3

4
5

6

facts.

The quantity and

quality of information necessary to

V. Van Dome, 139 Idaho 961, 963, 88 P.3d 780, 782, (Idaho
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 17; see also, U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

State

Katz
State

V.

v.

Ct.

App. 2004).

United States, 389 US. 347, 356, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 (1967).
Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 81 1, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009).

OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Page 3 of 15

Page 106

V

V

establish reasonable suspicion

cause.

Still,

is less

than that necessary to establish probable

more than a mere hunch or inchoate and
Whether an ofﬁcer possessed reasonable suspicion is

reasonable suspicion requires

unparticularized suspicion.

evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances

known

to the

ofﬁcer

at

or

before the time of the stop.7

Regarding the level of reasonable suspicion necessary t0 warrant a
Court has stated

An

stop, the

Idaho Supreme

that:

informant‘s tip regarding

suspected criminal activity

may

give

rise

to

would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that a stop was appropriate. Whether a tip amounts to reasonable suspicion
depends on the totality of the circumstances including the substance, source, and
reliability of the information provided. In other words, a tip must possess
adequate indicia 0f reliability in order to justify a Terry stop. The more reliable

reasonable suspicion

when

it

the tip, the less information required to establish reasonable suspicions

Warrantiess Search Exception: Consent or Waiver as a Condition of Probation.

3.

“[C]onsent voluntarily given by someone with authority
requirement.”9 However,

when consent

constitutionally sufﬁcient consent

is

is

an exception to the warrant

asserted, the State carries the

was given?” Idaho Courts have held

encompasses Founh Amendment waivers, which operate as consents

burden “to show that
that:

“This exception

to search, given as

a

condition of probation or parole.””
Generally, such a waiver should be included in “the conditions of probation in the

probation order

.

.

.”

but failure to include them

is

advisement by the sentencing court of the Fourth
generally sufﬁcient.”

7
8

The

critical

element

is

not dispositive.” For instance, an oral

Amendment waiver

notice of the waiver.

’4

as a term of probation

This

is

is

so that “[a] defendant

Bishop, 146 Idaho at 81 1-12, 203 P.3d at 1210-11 (internal quotes and citations omitted).
81 1, 1210 (internal quotes and citations omitted).

1d. at
9

State

v.

Westlake, 158 Idaho 817, 820, 353 P.3d 433, 41, (Idaho Ct. App. 2015).

10

1d.

”
‘2
l3

14

State

v.

State

v.

Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364, 370, 347 P.3d 1025, 1031 (Idaho Ct. App. 2015).
Santana, 162 Idaho 79, __, 394 P.3d 122, 126 (Idaho Ct. App. 2017).

Id
1d
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V

has the right to decline probation
instead, serve the

when he

or she

deems

its

conditions too onerous and may,

suspended portion 0f the sentence.”15

Warrantiess Search Exception: Inevitable Discovery.

4.

The
in State

v.

inevitable discovery exception

Downing. ’6 In doing

Supreme Court, which

so,

it

was

recently explained

by the Idaho Supreme Court

adopted the explanation set forth by the United States

stated:

“If the prosecution can establish

by a preponderance of the evidence that the
[evidence] ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means
.

.

.

then the deterrence rationale has so

received. Anything less

would

little

basis that the evidence should be

reject logic, experience,

and

common sense?”

Therefore, this exception “asks courts to engage in a hypothetical ﬁnding into the lawful actions

law enforcement would have inevitably taken in the absence of the unlawful avenue that led
the evidence.” If the evidence

actions taken

by law enforcement,

law enforcement should be

that

would have been discovered through the
it is

‘in the

to

inevitable, lawful

thus saved from the exclusionary rule.” “The premise

is

same, not a worse, position that they would have been’

absent the misconduct?”

Miranda Warnings

5.

“The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision
interrogation

must be

the lawyer with

15
‘6

clearly informed that

in

Miranda requires

he has the

that ‘an individual held for

right to consult with a

him during interrogation?” Such a warning

is

lawyer and to have

only required in custodial

[d
164 Idaho 26, __, 407 P.3d 1285, 1289-90 (2017).
at ___, 1290 (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.s. 43 1, 444

‘2 Id.

(1

984)) (emphasis added).

‘

1d.
'9

See

2°

1d.
2‘

id.

(quoting Nix

State

v.

v.

Williams,

467 U.s. 43 1, 444 (1984).

James, 148 Idaho 574, 576, 225 P.3d

1

169,

1

171 (Idaho 2010) (quoting

Miranda

v.

Arizona, 384

us.

436, 471 (1966)).
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V

Interrogations.” Determining whether the interrogation

“‘examine

all

reasonable

man in the

of the circumstances surrounding the

on the defendant

to

suspect’s position

was

custodial requires a court to

interrogation.”’23 This test “‘is

would have understood

showAthey were in custody

at the

his situation.”’24

how a

The burden

time the interrogation occurred.”

is

As a

general rule, “‘persons temporarily detained pursuant to [trafﬁc] stops are not ‘in custody’ for the

purposes of Miranda.

”’26

III.

ANALYSIS
As

stated above,

“The Fourth Amendment

freedom from unreasonable searches and

to the

seizures. Its

United States Constitution guarantees

purpose

is to

impose a standard of

reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by governmental agents to safeguard an
individual's privacy

offers the

same

and security against arbitrary invasions?” The Idaho State Constitution

protection, With language similar to the Federal Constitution:

“The

right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and

no warrant

shall issue without probable

cause shown by

afﬁdavit, particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be

seized?”

In order t0 ensure these rights and protect against erosion the courts have declared that seizures

and “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth

Amendment ———-—subject only

to a

few

speciﬁcally established and well~delineated exceptions?” These exceptions include (1) seizure

22
23

Id
Id. at
Id.

Z 1d.
26

577, 1172 (quoting Stansbwy

(quoting Berkemer

v.

v.

California, 511 U.S. 318,

322 (1994)).

McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984)).

(quoting Berkemer v. McCarzy, 468 us. 420, 44o (1984)).
Van Dome, 139 Idaho at 963, 88 P.3d at 782.
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 17; see also, U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See Katz, 389 U.s. at 356, 88 S.Ct. 514.

1d.
27
28

29
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based upon reasonable suspicion (2) waiver by consent, and (3) inevitable discovery. Each of
these

is

discussed in greater detail below. The Court also discusses the Miranda issue raised by

the defendant.

1.

Ofﬁcer Smith Murdock had Reasonable Suspicion

t0 Seize

Brandon

Generally, a seizure 0f a person must be based on probable cause to be

Parris.

deemed

reasonable.” However, the United States and Idaho Supreme Courts have delineated this narrow
exception:

[L]imited

invastigatory

permissible

detentions,

when justiﬁed by an

based 0n less than probable cause, are

ofﬁcer’s reasonable articulable suspicion that a

is about to commit, a crime. Reasonable suspicion must
be based 0n speciﬁc, articulable facts and the rational inferences that can be
drawn from those facts. The quantity and quality of information necessary t0
establish reasonable suspicion is less than that necessary to establish probable

person has committed, or

cause.

Still,

reasonable suspicion requires

more than a mere hunch 0r inchoate and

unparticularized suspicion. Whether an ofﬁcer possessed reasonable suspicion

evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances

known

is

to the ofﬁcer at or

before the time of the stop}

Regarding the

level

Court has stated

An

of reasonable suspicion necessary to warrant a stop, the Idaho Supreme

that:

informant's tip regarding

suspected

criminal activity

may

give rise to

would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
Whether a tip amounts to reasonable suspicion
depends on the totality of the circumstances including the substance, source, and
reliability of the information provided In other words, a tip must possess
adequate indicia of reliability 1n order to justify a Terry stop. The more reliable

reasonable suspicion
belief that a stop

the

tip,

was

when

the less information required to establish reasonable suspicion.

The Court heard testimony
riding his bike

17,

3°
3‘

32

it

appropriate.

at the

Motion

on the evening of September

17,

to

32

Suppress hearing that Smith observed a

man

2017. The Court notes that prior to September

2017, Smith had been provided with a description and photos of an individual suspected of

Bishop, 146 Idaho at 81 1, 203 P.3d at 1210.
Id. at 81 1-12, at 1210-11 (internal quotes and citations omitted).
1d. at

81

1,

OPINION

1210

(internal quotes

and

citations omitted).
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burglarizing the Idaho Falls Zoo.

When he

observed the

man riding his bike, he noticed the bike

did not have any lights (a violation of law) and that the rider resembled the individual in the

photos provided to him
facts,

Smith

initiated

(i.e.

the photos of the

man who had

burglarized the zoo). Based on these

a stop to investigate further. During the course of this stop, Smith

discovered methamphetamine on Parris’s person and placed him under

The Court notes
exhibits at the hearing.

that the photos

arrest.

and an email describing the zoo burglar were entered as

The Court compared the photos

at the

Motion to Suppress hearing, the

Court made a ﬁnding on the record that Farris resembled the suspected burglar shown in the
photos.
In support of the Motion to Suppress, Parris’s legal counsel has argued that Smith

extended the duration of the stop longer than necessary and abandoned the original purpose of
the stop.

The Court does not ﬁnd

had reasonable suspicion
at

this persuasive.

to stop Farris

Based on the Court’s

analysis,

Ofﬁcer Smith

and investigate two suspected crimes: (1) riding a bicycle

night without proper lights and (2) the zoo burglary.
In Idaho, “an investigative detention ‘must be temporary and last

necessary to effectuate the purpose
in order to investigate at least

this

<')f

the stop.’”

33

As

no longer than

is

discussed above, Smith initiated the stop

two suspected Violations of law. Based on the Court’s analysis

and other sections of its opinion, Smith had reasonable suspicion

to justify the stop

in

and did

not deviate from or abandon that purpose of investigating the zoo burglary. If the only purpose

for the stop

stop

33

was the

fail

to

have lighting on the bicycle, then the defense

was extended. However,

State

v.

as stated, the stop involved

is

correct in arguing that

two separate incidents

(i.e.

Florida
Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 563, 112 P.3d 848, 851 (Idaho Ct. App. 2005) (quoting

v.

the lights

Royer, 460

LLS.491,500(1983D.
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‘

and the zoo burglary). Because the zoo burglary was one of the reasons for the
stop

was not extended due

2.

to the

initial stop,

the

zoo burglary investigation.

The Defendant Waived

the Warrant Requirement by Consenting to Warrantless
Searches as Condition of Probation, and Consent was not Coerced.

As

stated above, “[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior

approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth

Amendment ———subj ect

only t0 a few speciﬁcally established and well-delineated exceptions?” Consent
exceptions.

35

The Idaho Supreme Court has

with authority

is

stated:

one of these

“[C]onsent voluntarily given by someone

an exception to the warrant requirement.

the State carries the burden “to

is

show that constitutionally

9,3 6

However, when consent

sufﬁcient consent

was

is

asserted,

given.”37

The consent exception “encompasses Fourth Amendment waivers, which operate

as

consents to search, given as a condition of probation or parole?” Generally, such a waiver

should be included in “the conditions of probation in the probation order

them

include

Fourth

is

notice of the waiver.“ This

its

.

but failure t0

not dispositive.” For instance, an oral advisement by the sentencing court of the

Amendment waiver as a term of probation

she deems

.”
.

is

is

generally sufﬁcient.“

The

critical

so that “[a] defendant has the right to decline probation

element

when he

is

or

conditions too onerous and may, instead, serve the suspended portion of the

sentence?“
In support of the

right as

34
35

Motion

t0 Suppress, Farris argues that

he never consented or waived

this

a condition 0f probation. Additionally, he argues that he was never apprised of this

389 us. at 356, 88 S.Ct. at 514.
Westlake, 158 Idaho at 820, 353 P.3d at 41.

Katz,

36

Id.
37

Id

38

Armstrong, 158 Idaho
39
Santana, 162 Idaho at

347 P.3d at 1031.
394 P.3d at 126.

at 370,

m,

4o

1d.
41

42

1d
1d.
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waiver prior to being placed 0n probation. The State has objected and asserts that Parris did
indeed waive his Fourth

Amendment rights

as a condition of probation. In support, the State

points to the order of probation completed at Parris’s sentencing for his prior charge of driving

without privileges. At argument, Parris’s counsel asserted that Parris was not orally advised of
this

waiver

time of sentencing, a copy of the sentencing audio was provided to the Court.

at the

Based on the following, the Court concludes
warrantless searches and seizures under the Fourth

conviction indicates that Farris

property

was

to

that Farris did

Amendment.

waive his

First, the

“Refuse no alcohol or drug

test 0r

rights regarding

judgment and order of

search or person,

& vehicle?” Although Parris’s counsel argued this box was merely checked as a matter

of course,

this is

of little consequence.

It is

condition of probation. Therefore, the box

Parris’s probation

was

that

checked as a matter of course because

was checked,

it is

a standard

clearly indicating that a condition

he “Refuse n0 alcohol or drug

test

of

or search or person, property

&

vehicle?“

Pam's had the right to decline probation

if he

deemed

its

conditions too onerous and

could have served the suspended portion of the sentence.“ Instead of declining probation, Parris
signed the order of probation. The Court ﬁnds that his signature
statement

is

on the form, alongside the

“DEFENDANT hereby agrees to conditions of probation.” The magistrate, Judge

Walker, also signed this form.“
Second, Judge Walker orally advised Parris that he “must follow other nonnal terms of
probation.

3’47
.

.

The Court concludes

that this

his rights regarding warrantiess searches

43

4“
45

4"
4’

and

was sufﬁcient

seizures.

to apprise Farris

The Court recognizes

of his waiver of

that being subj ect to_

Exhibit 4.

Exhibit 4.

Santana, 162 Idaho at

Q 394

P.3d

ac 126.

Exhibit 4.

Exhibit 2, at 9:23.
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\_/

warrantless searches and seizures

is

a normal condition of probation. Additionally, Parris was

represented bypounsel at sentencing and could have asked questions regarding what Judge

Walker meant by “other normal terms”

if Panis desired.

The Court notes the absence of any

objection or question in the record to this effect.

Based upon the judgment and order of conviction, the Court concludes
aware

that

probation.

that Farris

he was waiving his right to warrantless searches and seizures as a condition of

The Court

also concludes that he did

waive

this right.

He had legal

counsel at the

hearing and could have consulted his counsel. Mr. Parris signed the document but

have

to

was

do

so;

he could have served the jail term

consent prior to the search. However,

withdrawing his consent

(Le.

instead. Farris also could

when presented with the

it

he did not

have withdrawn his

legal options

and implications of

being taken into custody and serving the jail time originally

imposed), Farris chose not to withdraw consent and subj ected himself to the search. If Parris had
persisted in withdrawing his consent the legal consequence

would have occurred: he would have

been arrested, booked into jail, and searched.
3.

Discovery of the Methamphetamine was Inevitable.

As explained

above, the doctrine 0f inevitable discovery requires the prosecution t0

‘

“‘establish

by a preponderance of the evidence

that the’” wrongfully obtained evidence

“ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means

.

.

3”“ Accordingly,

this

“asks courts to engage in a hypothetical ﬁnding into the lawful actions law enforcement would

have inevitably taken in the absence of the unlawful avenue that led to the evidence?” If the

law
evidence would have been discovered through the inevitable, lawful actions taken by

48

Downing, 164 Idaho

at __,

407 P.3d

at

1290 (quoting Nix

v.

Williams,

467 us. 43 1, 444 (1984)).

49
1d.
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v
enforcement,

should be

it is

‘in the

'V

thus saved from the exclusionary rule.” “The premise

is

that

law enforcement

same, not a worse, position that they would have been’ absent the

misconduct?“

As

stated above, Parris

Testimony was proffered

was on probation when he was stopped by Ofﬁcer Smith.

at the

Motion

t0 Suppress healing that if Parris

had persisted

in

withdrawing consent to search, he Farris would have been arrested on an agent’s warrant for
Violating the terms 0f his probation and been taken to jail.

would then have been searched subsequent to
to jail.

The Court

booked

arrest,

also heard testimony that Parris

into the jail.

The Court heard testimony

that Parris

placed in Smith’s patrol car, and transported

would have been searched when he was

A search at either of these junctures would have been lawful; therefore, the

Court concludes that the discovery of the methamphetamine was inevitable and Parris’s Motion
to

Suppress should be denied.

Miranda

4.

“The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision
interrogation

must be

the lawyer with

in

Miranda requires

clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer

him during interrogationmﬂ Such a warning

interrogations.” Determining whether the interrogation

“‘examine

all

reasonable

man in the

of the circumstances surrounding the
suspect’s position

on the defendant to show they were

50

See

that ‘an individual held for

was

is

and

to

have

only required in custodial

custodial requires a court to

interrogation.’”5“ This test “‘is

would have under stood

his situation?”

how a
The burden

in custody at the time the interrogation occurred.“

As

is

a

id.

5'

1d. at ___,

1290 (quoting Nix

v.

Williams,

467 U.S. 43 1, 444 (1984).

ssznum,1481dah0at576,225¥%3dat1171(quoﬁngAdhandav.Arw0na,384ILS.436,471(1966».

n
54

hi
Id. at

55

Id.

w Id

577, 1172 (quoting Stansbury

(quoting Berkemer

OPINION

v.

v.

California, 511 U.S. 318,

322 (1994)).

McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984)).
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V

‘V‘

general rule, “‘persons temporarily detained pursuant to [trafﬁc] stops are not ‘in custody’ for the

purposes 0f Miranda.

”’57

In this case, the Court concludes that Smith

Miranda warning because

Farris

Supreme Court has

stated:

States

was not

was not required to provide

in custody.

Parris with a

Regarding the Miranda warning, the United

Although the circumstances of each case must certainly inﬂuence a determination
of whether a suspect is “in custody” for purposes of receiving Miranda protection,
is simply whether there is a “formal arrest or
freedom 0f movement” of the degree associated with a formal arrest.”

the ultimate inquiry

The Court has reviewed Smith’s encounter with
Smith’s bodycam footage.”

Upon

restraint

on

Parris as presented in the footage

review, the Court does not

ﬁnd

from

the circumstances of this

encounter were sufﬁcient to conclude that Parris was “in custody” for Miranda purposes.

Although Smith directed

Parris to stand 0r

remain where another ofﬁcer directed him, for most

of the encounter Farris was not placed in handcuffs or placed in a patrol car and maintained some

freedom of movement. Smith did conduct a pat~down search of Farris but
custodial search.

was not a

this

The pat-down was cursory and was merely t0 determine whether

threat to the ofﬁcers

on scene while Smith attempted

to ensure the ofﬁcers’ safety during a search

this

was only

of Parris’s person. One of the ofﬁcers

Speciﬁcally told Farris, “Sir, you’re not under arrest; we’re just detaining you because
get that knife out

a,

to contact Parris’s probation ofﬁcer.

Although Parris was placed in handcuffs near the end of the encounter,
done

Farris posed

we

gotta

of your pocket?“ The Court notes that Parris wasn’t placed in handcuffs

until a

concern of ofﬁcer safety arose.

57

Id.
58

(quoting Berkemer

California

v.

v.

us. 420, 440 (1984)).
1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520 (1983) (quoting Oregon

McCarty, 468

Beheler, 463

us.

v.

Mathiason, 429 U.s.

492, 495 (1977)).
59

Exhibit 3, State

v.

Farris, Bonneville

County case no. CR-2017-9957 (admitted February

5,

201 8) (hereinaﬁer

“Exhibit 3”).
6°

Exhibit 3, at 25:45.

OPINION

AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Page 13 of 15

Page 116

V
The Court also

V

notes the absence 0f any sort of interrogation during the encounter.

Although Smith did ask some questions, these were related

to

conﬁrming

was on

that Farris

probation and identifying his probation ofﬁcer, and items on Parris’s person and in his pockets.

Absent from the exchange are any interrogatory questions.

The Court notes

the discovery of a small plastic

baggy of methamphetamine

Parris’s pockets.

However, the discovery of the methamphetamine was not the

of interrogation;

it

was

the result of a search.

d0 With a search. As stated above,

Based on the foregoing

it is

analysis, Parris

interrogation; therefore, he

was not

in

result

one of

of any

sort

The provision of a Miranda warning has nothing

to

only required as a precursor to a custodial interrogation.

was not

entitled to a

in custody

and was not the subject of an

Miranda warning and Defendant’s motion

should be denied.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:
1-

IT IS

Defendant’s Motion to Suppress

is

DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Dated

this

£3

day of February 2018.

Bruce L. Pickett
District Judge
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